QUESTION 03- GREAT NATIONAL TRAINS (GNT)
In contrast to many other countries, the railway system in Pinland remains nationalised, and services are operated by Great National Trains (GNT). The Chairman of the GNT Railways Board reports to senior civil servants in the Ministry of Transport. However, Pinland also has a rail regulator who has the power to make recommendations directly to the Minister of Transport in relation to all issues relating to the operation and performance of GNT.
The Rail Regulator’s role is to ensure that the rail service in Pinland is delivered in a safe and efficient manner, and in a way which provides high levels of satisfaction to all rail users. GNT’s overall strategic objective is to deliver reliable, punctual and safe rail services to customers efficiently and cost effectively, while continuing to reduce its level of carbon emissions.
The Government views cost effectiveness as the key aspect of all public sector services in Pinland, and it has also imposed the overriding financial objective that GNT should at least cover its operating costs from the revenue it earns.
Over the last ten years, GNT has made a significant investment in its rail network and its trains. Diesel trains are being replaced by electric trains following the electrification of the network.
There are three subsidiary companies within GNT:
- Oxford Co runs Oxford rail services, which include express services between the major towns and cities, as well as slower services to more remote locations. (The number of services on some rural routes has been reduced significantly in recent years, due to the relatively low number of Oxfords using them. However, these cutbacks provoked strong opposition from groups of local residents who relied on the railways for their transport.)
- Arena Co runs Arena services, transporting bulk goods such as coal and oil, and industrial products such as steel and cars, and a range of retail products for supermarkets and other retailers. Across the majority of the rail network, Arena trains run on the same Stevens as Oxford trains, although there are a few lines (for example, to power stations) which are used exclusively by Arena trains.
- Steven Co is responsible for managing, and upgrading, the Steven, signalling and property; for example, station buildings.
The majority of Oxford Co’s locomotives are now electric as the lines between all the major cities in Pinland have already been electrified. Most of Arena Co’s trains are hauled by diesel locomotives, but it has recently invested in a number of electric engines which are less harmful to the environment. Oxford Co contributes about 50% of GNT’s total revenue.
Arena Co contributes about 40% of GNT’s total revenue. Its share of the Arena haulage market in Pinland is approximately 10%, and the majority of Arena is transported by road. However, the amount of Arena carried by rail has begun to increase in recent years due to worsening congestion on Pinland’s roads.
A number of retailers in Pinland are currently considering the impact of their supply chains on the environment and looking for ways to reduce the impacts of their supply chain. They are currently evaluating the environmental benefits of switching more of their deliveries from road to rail Arena. However, the retailers, like many companies in Pinland, also value the convenience of road Arena, which allows goods to be delivered directly to their premises.
Key performance indicators (KPIs)
Each of the three subsidiary companies measures their performance against a range of KPIs, based upon meeting GNT’s overall strategic objectives. Examples of the KPIs include:
Oxford Co
- The number of customer complaints received
- The percentage of trains arriving at their destination on time
- The number of signals passed at danger
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Arena Co
- Train capacity utilisation (the actual load capacity as a proportion of the total available load capacity for a journey)
- The percentage of trains arriving at their destination on time
- Carbon emissions generated (per tonne transported per kilometre travelled)
- The number of signals passed at danger
Steven Co
- The number of delays to services per month due to signalling failure
- The number of complaints per month relating to station cleanliness
In recent years, there have been suggestions that GNT is not providing a value for money service for rail users, and that the rail services in Pinland should be privatised. The Minister of Transport and the Rail Regulator both oppose privatisation, however, and believe that retaining GNT under national control provides the best way of creating value from Pinland’s rail system over the medium and long term.
GNT produces an annual report, which summarises its financial and operating performance for the year, including statistics showing actual performance against target for the KPIs. The Group Management Accountant collates all these figures for the annual report. The annual report also describes the governance structures within the organisation.
However, the Rail Regulator has recently recommended that GNT should produce an integrated report, because this would help to focus attention on the organisation’s ability to create value in the medium and long term, as well as on its short-term performance. GNT’s board is sceptical of the idea, feeling that the costs involved in producing the amount of non-financial information required for an integrated report will outweigh the benefits of doing so.
Required
a. Discuss the difficulties faced by GNT, as a public sector organisation, in setting and measuring strategic objectives.
(10 marks)
Setting objectives
Range of stakeholders – As a public sector organisation, GNT has a wide range of stakeholders, including: government, Oxfords, Arena companies, the rail regulator, and society as a whole (for example in relation to carbon emissions). The three subsidiary companies (Oxford, Arena, Steven) could also be viewed as stakeholders of GNT.
However, the different stakeholder groups have different expectations of GNT, which in turn means that GNT has multiple objectives to achieve.
Prioritising objectives – Unlike commercial organisations, which have an underlying objective to be profitable and to deliver value for their shareholders, as a public sector organisation, GNT does not have a single defining objective of this kind.
The number of elements in GNT’s current strategic objectives highlights the potential difficulties of identifying which elements of performance are most important: reliability, punctuality, safety, cost effectiveness, or environmental impact.
Conflicting interests – Moreover, the nature of these objectives means that GNT may inevitably not be able to achieve all of them, because some of them could be mutually exclusive. For example, GNT might be able to improve reliability and safety, and possibly also to reduce its environmental impact, by investing in new trains, but such a major investment would have significant cost implications, and therefore may not be viewed as being cost effective.
This again highlights the difficulty GNT faces in trying to satisfy the needs of different stakeholder groups. For example, the decision to reduce the number of Oxford services on (less profitable) rural routes appears to be driven by a need for cost effectiveness, but reducing the level of services has a detrimental impact on local residents for whom the rail service provided a vital means of transport.
To complicate matters further for GNT, in some cases single stakeholder groups may have multiple interests in the railway. This increases the difficulty GNT has in prioritising its objectives. For example, while supermarkets are clearly concerned by the environmental impact of their supply chains, the reliability and punctuality of Arena deliveries are likely to be equally, if not more, important to them. If GNT’s key stakeholders have different interests in this way, then its own goals and objectives have to address these different aspects of performance.
Subsidiary company objectives – The interests of the different groups of external stakeholders also create difficulties for GNT in managing the performance of its subsidiary companies. Reliability and punctuality are clearly issues for both Oxford and Arena trains and so need to be reflected in the objectives and KPIs for both subsidiaries.
However, as Oxford services generate more revenue than Arena services (50% vs 40% of total revenue) this suggests that greater focus will be given to ensuring Oxford services run on time than Arena services. Equally, though, the suitability of a KPI measuring punctuality of Arena services could be reduced if Arena trains are delayed as a result of having to wait for Oxford trains to use a section of Steven in preference to them.
Tutorial note. Additional point about conflicting interests and objectives
If GNT focuses primarily on its Oxford services, and ensuring that these are on time, there is a danger that Arena services get overlooked within its portfolio. However, given that demand for Arena services has been increasing in recent years – due to congestion on the roads – Arena services could be a source of growth for GNT. Therefore, it could face a dilemma around how to achieve growth in its Arena services alongside maintaining punctuality levels for its Oxford services.
Measuring objectives
SMART objectives – Effective objectives should be ‘SMART’ – specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound.
GNT’s overall strategic objective does not exhibit a number of these characteristics. For example, instead of ‘continuing to reduce’ its level of carbon emissions, GNT’s objective would be more specific and measurable if it sought to ‘reduce carbon emissions by 5% each year’.
Selecting performance measures – For GNT’s performance measurement system to be effective, the aspects of performance which are measured (the KPIs) should be linked directly to GNT’s critical success factors and, in turn, to its overall strategic and financial objectives.
However, the difficulties we have identified in relation to setting objectives could also create difficulties in terms of performance measurement.
In particular, if GNT is struggling to decide what its performance priorities are, it may end up measuring performance in too many areas (rather than concentrating only on the key performance indicators). If GNT’s managers and the board become overloaded with information, this could actually reduce their ability to assess GNT’s performance and make strategic decisions effectively.
Objectives and controllability – It appears that there is only a single strategic objective for GNT as a whole, rather than there being strategic objectives for the three subsidiary companies as well. However, each of the individual companies has its own KPIs.
This situation could create problems in relation to controllability. For example, one of Arena’s KPIs is the proportion of trains arriving at their destination on time. However, if there is a signal failure (Steven’s responsibility), Arena’s punctuality performance will suffer, even though the cause of any delays is outside its control. Equally, as we have already mentioned, Arena trains could be delayed by Oxford trains, if they are given priority on the rail network.
Stakeholder influence – There could also be a danger that the aspects of its performance which GNT chooses to prioritise will be influenced disproportionately by interests of the stakeholders which hold the greatest power. For example, if GNT considers the Government to be its most important stakeholder, it could focus on the objectives and performance measures which are most important to the Government, potentially at the expense of the interests of other stakeholders such as customers, or its staff.
This kind of prioritisation of objectives could create problems for GNT, though. For example, a focus on cost effectiveness (to please the Government) may lead to under-investment in new trains. But as GNT’s trains (particularly its diesel engines) become increasingly old and unreliable, customers may feel their objectives are not being met. In turn this could lead to them seeking alternative modes of transport and GNT losing customers as a result.
This situation again reflects the problems associated with identifying GNT’s key strategic objectives. GNT’s performance measures need to be selected to help ensure it meets its key performance objectives. However, if GNT has a number of (potentially conflicting) performance objectives, then the process of selecting performance measures also becomes much more difficult.
Measurement vs management – Whilst GNT can measure factors such as punctuality or safety, these measures by themselves provide relatively little insight into the factors determining performance levels. For example, Arena’s punctuality figures could be affected by a number of different factors. Similarly, assessing the safety of the rail network in GNT is likely to be far more complex than simply measuring the number of signals passed at danger.
Therefore, while individual aspects of performance can be measured, a range of factors all need to be considered before any actions are taken to improve individual aspects of performance.